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Coerced Confessions: Self-Policing in the
Shadow of the Regulator
Jodi L. Short*
University of California, Berkeley
Michael W. Toffel**
Harvard Business School
As part of a recent trend toward more cooperative relations between regulators
and industry, novel government programs are encouraging firms to monitor their
own regulatory compliance and voluntarily report their own violations. In this
study, we examine how regulatory enforcement activities influence organiza-
tions’ decisions to self-police. We created a comprehensive data set for the
‘‘Audit Policy,’’ a United States Environmental Protection Agency program that
encourages companies to self-disclose violations of environmental laws and
regulations in exchange for reduced sanctions. We find that facilities are more
likely to self-disclose if they were recently subjected to one of several different
enforcement measures and if they were provided with immunity from prosecu-
tion for self-disclosed violations.
The pitched political battles over regulation in the 1970s and 1980s, from de-
regulation to Reagan’s vow to get government ‘‘off the back’’ of industry, have
given way in recent years to a new wave of voluntary self-regulation programs
based on a more cooperative approach between government and industry. Reg-
ulatory agencies are embracing programs that see firms as active participants in
their own governance. And from the industry side, talk is increasingly about
companies regulating themselves rather than trying to avoid regulation alto-
gether. These new cooperative arrangements enjoy wide support, both from
industry proponents who see self-regulation as the most flexible and efficient
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way to achieve regulatory goals (Murray 1999) and in a substantial body
of academic literature touting the virtues of a more cooperative regulatory sys-
tem (Bardach and Kagan 1982; Scholz 1984; Ayres and Braithwaite 1992;
Gunningham and Grabosky 1998).
This cooperative approach has inspired regulatory agencies to experiment
with an array of voluntary self-regulation programs that engage firms as part-
ners in regulatory activities, from achieving ‘‘beyond compliance’’ results to
policing their own noncompliance. Beyond compliance programs, such as the
United States Environmental Protection Agency’s (US EPA) Greenlights, 33/
50 and Project XL, as well as industry initiatives, such as the chemical man-
ufacturers’ Responsible Care, recognize and reward firms for performance and
management practices that go above and beyond what the law requires. Al-
though there is little evidence that such programs actually improve perfor-
mance (King and Lenox 2000; Welch et al. 2000; Rivera and de Leon
2004), they have been popular for their feel-good, ‘‘win-win’’ approach to reg-
ulation. However, administrative agencies can justify outsourcing more and
more of their responsibilities to regulated entities only if corporations are will-
ing to admit and correct their failures as well as tout their successes.
‘‘Self-policing’’ programs push the envelope of self-regulation by shifting
the burden of monitoring regulatory compliance and reporting noncompliance
from the government to the private sector. Several regulatory agencies have
developed self-policing programs that provide incentives to encourage com-
panies to self-disclose their legal violations. For example, through its Hazard
Analysis and Critical Control Point program, the US Department of Agricul-
ture ‘‘shifted much of the responsibility for safety to the plants, requiring them
to identify vulnerable points in their production lines and build in steps to kill
germs’’ (Peterson and Drew 2003:A1). In addition, the US Department of Jus-
tice, the US Department of Defense, and the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission offer incentives including amnesty, limited liability, prosecutorial
leniency, and confidentiality to encourage companies to disclose fraudulent
or other illegal behavior (Fleder 1999; Duggin 2003; Medinger 2003).
These types of initiatives carry promise as well as pitfalls. On the one hand,
the incentives of self-policing programs have encouraged many companies to
report and correct problems that regulators never would have discovered, sug-
gesting the potential for real improvements in compliance. If compliance does
improve at self-policing firms, regulators could shift their scarce enforcement
resources to more recalcitrant companies. On the other hand, there is some
evidence that self-reported violations are often minor, perhaps masking more
serious unreported violations (Pfaff and Sanchirico 2004). Without
any evidence that self-policing improves compliance, such programs may give
industry an unprecedented and unwarranted level of control over its own reg-
ulation, raising ‘‘fears of the fox guarding the henhouse’’ (Cox 2004:28). How
can regulators establish self-policing programs that balance these concerns?
Although the academic literature has long explored regulatory strategies that
rely on some mix of voluntary reporting and governmental enforcement
(e.g., Malik 1993; Kaplow and Shavell 1994; Innes 1999a, 1999b; Pfaff
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and Sanchirico 2000; Innes 2001), this literature is largely theoretical; little
empirical evidence exists to suggest what mix most effectively encourages
self-policing.
Among the first empirical studies to address self-policing behavior, this ar-
ticle seeks to understand how a mix of regulatory enforcement activities and
statutory protections that shield companies from enforcement activities can be
used to encourage organizations to police their own operations and ‘‘turn them-
selves in’’ by self-disclosing violations. We develop a panel data set of vol-
untary disclosures under the US EPA’s Audit Policy, which provides rich data
on how violators behave when offered the option of voluntarily self-reporting.
We find that, despite the rhetoric of cooperation surrounding self-policing pro-
grams, self-disclosures are motivated by coercive regulatory enforcement ac-
tivities. Specifically, facilities were more likely to self-disclose violations if
they were recently inspected, subjected to an enforcement action, or narrowly
targeted for heightened scrutiny by a US EPA Compliance Incentive Program.
We also find some evidence that facilities are more likely to turn themselves in
when statutory immunity shields their self-disclosed violations from prosecu-
tion, but no evidence that facilities protected by audit privilege are more likely
to self-disclose.
The article proceeds as follows. In the next section, we review the literature
on self-policing and the related literature that describes how deterrence mea-
sures affect compliance. In Section 2, we describe the US EPA Audit Policy,
the empirical setting of our research. In Section 3, we hypothesize how various
enforcement activities and legal protections that shield self-reporters from
enforcement activities may influence facilities’ decisions whether to self-
police. Section 4 describes our sample and measures, and Section 5 details
our empirical methods and presents our results. We discuss our results in
Section 6 and offer suggestions for future research. Finally, we conclude in
Section 7.
1. Literature Review
The most robust discussion of self-policing occurs in the economic literature,
which models self-reporting of legal violations as a way to optimize enforce-
ment regimes by reducing monitoring and compliance costs. Kaplow and
Shavell (1994) develop a model that integrates a self-reporting component into
Becker’s (1968) classic theory of probabilistic law enforcement. They dem-
onstrate that self-reporting reduces government monitoring and enforcement
costs because, to the extent that violators admit their wrongdoing, ‘‘enforce-
ment effort need not be spent identifying them’’ (Kaplow and Shavell
1994:584). Innes (2001) extends this model, demonstrating that self-reporting
optimizes the allocation of enforcement resources by lowering avoidance costs
for the regulators and the regulated and by increasing the likelihood and low-
ering the costs of remediation (Innes 1999a).
A few prior studies have identified factors that lead firms to self-police.
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violators with a greater risk of apprehension are more likely to self-disclose
their wrongdoing, but his model does not address what factors constitute and
influence perception of this risk. Others have proposed how regulators can set
fines to optimize compliance using self-reporting. Malik (1993), for instance,
argues that an enforcement regime that relies on mandatory self-reporting of
emissions data will be optimized only if regulators impose sufficiently large
fines for violations that were not self-reported. Pfaff and Sanchirico (2000)
demonstrate that more firms would voluntarily conduct self-audits if fines
for violations were made contingent on the firm’s investigative effort.
Several studies in the economic, legal, and policy literatures suggest that
enforcement activities tend to discourage self-policing and self-reporting. Ar-
guing that exposure to enforcement actions is a powerful disincentive to self-
policing, some commentators call for greater statutory protections to shield
would-be self-policers from legal liability for their violations (Hunt and
Wilkins 1992; Goldsmith and King 1997; Grayson and Landgraf 1997; Murray
1999; Innes 2001). Innes (2001:253), for example, argues that the internal
compliance audit information regulators may obtain in connection with vol-
untary disclosures ‘‘can place a self-reporter at risk for other civil enforcement
actions.’’Most commentators agree that this risk ‘‘is a major stumbling block to
the widespread participation of American companies in the system’’ (Murray
1999:56). This logic suggests that the government must provide legal protec-
tions to mitigate exposure to enforcement activities in order to encourage firms
to self-police.
The related literature that describes how enforcement activities affect reg-
ulatory compliance, however, suggests a different result. There is broad con-
sensus in this literature that enforcement activities improve compliance, even
when they are confrontational and coercive. For example, numerous studies
have shown that regulatory inspections improve compliance at targeted firms
(Magat and Viscusi 1990; Braithwaite and Makkai 1991; Kuperan and Sutinen
1998; Gray and Shadbegian 2005; Gunningham et al. 2005; Shimshack and
Ward 2005), including compliance with legal requirements to monitor emis-
sions data and self-report permit violations (Laplante and Rilstone 1996;
Helland 1998). And growing empirical evidence suggests that more severe
deterrence measures such as penalties and enforcement actions also improve
facilities’ regulatory compliance (Gray and Scholz 1991; Aoki and Coiffi
2000; Gray and Shadbegian 2005; Gunningham et al. 2005; Mendelhoff
and Gray 2005; Shimshack and Ward 2005).
Our research expands on the existing literature in three important ways.
First, we add an empirical dimension to a literature on self-policing that
has been studied almost exclusively through the use of economic models.
Our data on violations voluntarily self-reported under the Audit Policy pro-
vide a unique window on self-policing behavior that is notoriously difficult to
observe. For example, the data enable us to test the competing claims in the
literature about whether stronger enforcement encourages or deters self-
policing. They also allow us to measure the incentive effects of a broad array
of enforcement tools, including inspections, violation citations, enforcement
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actions, and targeting initiatives; our results substantially expand the prior
literature’s focus on setting fines at the proper level. Second, we apply
insights from the compliance/deterrence literature in a novel setting to predict
not whether firms will comply with the law, but whether they will come clean
when they have failed to comply. Finally, by examining how traditional de-
terrence strategies influence self-policing practices, we contribute to the
broader debate about industry self-regulation by assessing the continued im-
portance of government enforcement activities within a cooperative regula-
tory environment.
2. The US EPA Audit Policy
The US EPA’s ‘‘Incentives for Self-Policing: Discovery, Correction and Pre-
vention of Violations’’ (Audit Policy), launched in 1995, provides the empir-
ical setting for our research. The Audit Policy seeks to encourage facilities to
implement ‘‘systematic, objective, and periodic’’ environmental auditing and to
develop a ‘‘documented, systematic procedure or practice which reflects the
regulated entity’s due diligence in preventing, detecting, and correcting viola-
tions’’ (US EPA 1995:66708). The program provides incentives for companies
to identify, voluntarily report, and correct environmental violations. In ex-
change, US EPA promises to reduce or waive penalties that would otherwise
be owed. To qualify for the Audit Policy’s incentives, facilities must promptly
disclose a violation to US EPA, correct the violation, and take steps to prevent
similar violations in the future. The Audit Policy does not apply to violations
that ‘‘resulted in serious actual harm or which may have presented an imminent
and substantial endangerment to public health or the environment’’ (US EPA
1995:66709) or to violations that are similar to others the facility committed
over the previous several years. Disclosures do not qualify under the Audit
Policy if they are required by any law, regulation, or permit provision, if they
occur in the context of an enforcement action, or if they are revealed by em-
ployee whistleblowers or discovered by third parties. Depending on whether
self-disclosed violations meet all these requirements, US EPA waives 75%–
100% of the gravity-based (punitive) penalties associated with them.1 In addi-
tion, US EPA assures self-disclosers that the agency will neither routinely re-
quest or use internal environmental audit reports as a part of routine inspections
or as the basis for civil or criminal investigations, nor refer self-reported
1. Gravity-based penalties are the punitive portion of a fine, set to reflect the egregiousness of
the violator’s wrongdoing. US EPA penalties may also contain an ‘‘economic benefit’’ component,
designed to recover any economic advantage the violations may have provided. For self-reporters
that meet all the Audit Policy’s conditions, US EPAwaives 100% of gravity-based penalties.When
violations are discovered by means other than environmental audits or due diligence efforts, but all
other conditions are met, 75% of gravity-based penalties are waived. US EPA retains full discretion
under the Audit Policy to recover any economic benefit the self-reporter gained as a result of com-
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violations to the US Department of Justice for criminal prosecution except in
rare circumstances.2
According to a dataset we constructed based on US EPA databases and
documents (described below), nearly 3500 facilities disclosed violations
during the period 1997–2003, and many of these facilities simultaneously dis-
closed multiple violations. Even though many self-reporters incurred signif-
icant costs to remedy the violations they voluntarily disclosed, the majority of
participants held favorable views of the program (US EPA 1999). US EPA also
touts the program as a success: ‘‘Discovery and correction of violations under
the policy have removed pollutants from the air and water, reduced health and
environmental risks, and improved public information on potential environ-
mental hazards’’ and ensured safe management of PCBs and other hazardous
wastes (US EPA 1999:26745).
In an empirical analysis of self-reporting under the US EPA Audit Policy,
Pfaff and Sanchirico (2004) compare violations voluntarily disclosed under the
Audit Policy with those discovered by US EPA. The study finds that self-
reported violations are significantly less severe than those routinely prosecuted
by the regulator, typically involving reporting or record-keeping violations and
only rarely involving more substantive environmental violations such as emis-
sions or spills. This finding is partly an artifact of the Audit Policy’s explicit
exclusion from its purview those violations that result in ‘‘serious actual harm
or substantial health risk’’ (US EPA 1995). This policy naturally skews self-
reporting toward violations that are less severe, in the sense that they are sub-
ject to lower penalties and do not immediately threaten human health or the
environment.3 Nonetheless, record-keeping and reporting are the lynchpin of
the US environmental regulatory system, enabling regulators to monitor com-
pliance and enforce substantive obligations: ‘‘Violations of monitoring and
reporting requirements should be viewed not as trivial paperwork violations,
but rather as serious violations’’ (Lin 1996:761). Although the Audit Policy has
limitations, it provides a useful context in which to identify the factors that
encourage self-reporting that may help regulators devise more effective incen-
tives to increase participation.
3. Why Do Organizations Turn Themselves In?
In this section, we hypothesize how various regulatory enforcement activities
may encourage organizations to turn themselves in when they have violated
2. Many commentators see these guidelines as insufficiently protective of self-reporters. Al-
though it does not routinely request a firm’s own internal audit reports, US EPA reserves the right
to seek them if it has independent reason to believe that a violation has occurred, and federal law
currently provides no audit privilege for their protection. In addition, although unlikely, self-
reporters place themselves at some risk of criminal charges as a result of their self-disclosures.
US EPA has wide discretion to determine whether a reported violation qualifies for immunity from
criminal prosecution, and even when it decides to grant that protection, the criminal environmental
enforcement arm of the US Department of Justice, which is not bound by the Audit Policy guide-
lines, may take a different view on how such cases should be treated.
3. For examples of violations disclosed under the Audit Policy, see US EPA (1999).
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regulatory requirements. To develop our hypotheses, we look to the extensive
literature on how enforcement activities influence regulatory compliance. Al-
though we recognize that there may be important distinctions between the in-
centive structures governing decisions to comply with the law and decisions to
voluntarily report a violation of the law, we believe that this literature provides
relevant insights into our question because it addresses how regulated firms
behave in response to a variety of legal and regulatory incentives.
The most common conceptualization of compliance behavior is grounded in
deterrence theory, an economic model that assumes firms are rational actors
that will comply with legal directives only to the extent that the costs of
expected penalties exceed the benefits of noncompliance (Kagan and Scholz
1984; Andreoni et al. 1998; Spence 2001). According to deterrence theory,
firms’ compliance behavior is influenced both by specific deterrence—‘‘the
fear engendered by the prior experience of being inspected, warned or penal-
ized themselves’’ (Thornton et al. 2005:263)—and by general deterrence—
‘‘hearing about legal sanctions against others’’ (Thornton et al. 2005:263;
Gibbs 1986). The deterrent effect of potential sanctions is often viewed as
a function of both their likelihood and their severity (e.g., Friedman 1975).
3.1 Enforcement Activities
We adopt deterrence theory’s premise to suggest that facilities will self-
disclose compliance violations when they expect to incur more costs for hiding
their violations than for disclosing them. Most prior work has focused on en-
couraging self-policing through incentives that lower the relative cost of self-
disclosing (Malik 1993; Pfaff and Sanchirico 2000). We look instead at how
the enforcement activities undertaken by regulators might encourage self-
policing by shaping a facility’s expectations about the likelihood and the
expected costs of getting caught out of compliance.
3.1.1 Specific Deterrence. Prior literature has shown that enforcement activ-
ities bolster compliance with legal requirements. This includes routine mon-
itoring activities like inspections (Magat and Viscusi 1990; Braithwaite and
Makkai 1991; Helland 1998; Kuperan and Sutinen 1998; Gray and Shadbegian
2005; Gunningham et al. 2005; Shimshack and Ward 2005), more aggressive
enforcement activities like citing facilities for violations (Helland 1998), and
even confrontational deterrence measures like penalties and enforcement
actions (Gray and Scholz 1991; Aoki and Coiffi 2000; Gray and Shadbegian
2005; Gunningham et al. 2005; Mendelhoff and Gray 2005; Shimshack and
Ward 2005). Each of these activities encourages compliance by raising the
potential cost of noncompliance. Frequent inspections increase the likelihood
that regulators will discover and penalize violations (Dimento 1989). Simi-
larly, cited violations increase this likelihood even more because regulators
are known to target enforcement resources on facilities where inspectors
have recently discovered violations (US EPA 1992; Helland 1998). As a result,
such facilities may expect a particularly high likelihood of apprehension
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to enforcement actions may be acutely sensitive to the costs of noncompliance,
both because they have incurred legal costs and often fines for their noncom-
pliance and because as ‘‘repeat offenders’’ they may face more severe conse-
quences for future violations.
We argue that these same enforcement activities will encourage self-
reporting in much the same way that they encourage compliance. Under-
pinning this view is our assumption that facilities self-report to bolster the
regulator’s confidence in their willingness to comply, with the expectation that
regulators may use self-reporting not simply to learn about violations they
failed to discover but to help sort out the ‘‘good apples’’ from the ‘‘bad’’
for purposes of targeting enforcement resources. So, for instance, facilities that
are frequently inspected may expect that self-disclosing will credibly signal
their commitment to compliance and encourage regulators to target their en-
forcement activities on other facilities that are less cooperative. Consequently,
we predict that facilities subjected to more frequent inspections will be more
likely to self-disclose violations.
Similarly, we expect that regulatory inspections that uncover violations will
encourage facilities to self-disclose. Being cited with violations suggests that
the firm has a poor relationship with regulators—both because of its apparent
unwillingness to comply and because high violation rates can result from dis-
mayed inspectors legalistically interpreting regulations to maximize the num-
ber of violations (Aoki and Coiffi 2000). Such firms may be particularly eager
to use self-reports to show their good-faith willingness to comply in an attempt
to mitigate their heightened scrutiny (Helland 1998). Therefore, controlling for
inspection rate, we expect organizations with more violations discovered by
inspectors to be more likely to self-report regulatory compliance violations.
Finally, we predict that facilities that have been subjected to enforcement
actions will be more likely to self-report. Enforcement actions are administra-
tive or judicial proceedings that subject firms to fines, penalties, and various
forms of injunctive relief, and they represent more serious compliance problems
than merely cited violations. Firms with poor compliance records have been
shown to go the extra mile to demonstrate compliance in order to restore their
reputation with the regulator (Scholz 1984; Helland 1998; Pfaff and Sanchirico
2000), and self-reporting violations may be one way to accomplish this.
3.1.2 General Deterrence. Beyond their own individual experience, facilities
are also influenced by enforcement activities that affect other organizations in
the broader regulatory community. For example, the overall stringency of an
inspection regime can influence companies’ expectations that regulators will
detect their violations (Epple and Visscher 1984; Cohen 1987, 2000). In ad-
dition, high-profile enforcement actions against other firms have motivated
some companies to improve their compliance and monitoring practices
(Thornton et al. 2005), and the fines imposed in such actions have been shown
to significantly improve compliance not only at the punished firm but also at
surrounding companies (Shimshack and Ward 2005).
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One way regulators attempt to leverage general deterrence incentives is by
launching targeted enforcement initiatives that single out particular industries
or activities for added scrutiny (Ross 1982; Epple and Visscher 1984; Cohen
1987; Anderson and Talley 1995). Such efforts are attempts to increase facil-
ities’ expectations that their violations will be discovered, thereby motivating
greater compliance. For example, US EPA has launched enforcement initia-
tives to encourage compliance and self-auditing within sectors such as steel
mini-mills and chemical manufacturers. To initiate these programs, US
EPA often sends letters to companies in the targeted group warning that fa-
cilities that fail to participate ‘‘will be targeted for potential enforcement
inspections’’ that ‘‘could result in an enforcement action.’’4 In addition, US
EPA releases a list of ‘‘National Priority’’ sectors where it will target enforce-
ment resources. Such campaigns are designed to encourage compliance by in-
creasing these targeted facilities’ perceived likelihood of getting caught. We
expect that this heightened expectation of getting caught will encourage organ-
izations facing general deterrence initiatives to self-disclose violations.
3.2 Statutory Protection from Enforcement
Although the compliance/deterrence literature suggests that enforcement ac-
tivities will encourage self-policing, many have suggested that facilities must
be shielded from the risk of enforcement actions in order to encourage self-
policing (Hunt and Wilkins 1992; Murray 1999; Innes 2001). This argument
has prompted many states to enact statutory protections of two kinds: (1) audit
privilege laws that prevent state regulatory agencies and private parties from
obtaining any documents produced in connection with an internal environmen-
tal audit or using them in court against a voluntary discloser, and (2) immunity
statutes that shield companies from prosecution for violations they voluntarily
self-disclose. States have taken a variety of approaches, with some providing
one or both of these protections and others providing none.
Many scholars argue that companies will not self-police by conducting com-
pliance audits and self-disclosing violations unless they can be assured that
materials produced in connection with these internal reviews will remain
strictly confidential (Hunt and Wilkins 1992; Goldsmith and King 1997;
Grayson and Landgraf 1997; Murray 1999; Innes 2001). State audit privilege
laws prevent the disclosure of this material and protect against a variety of
disclosure risks, including criminal liability, exposure to citizen suits, overlap-
ping state liability, and bad publicity. There is broad consensus that, ‘‘[u]nless
current law and existing policies are modified to broaden confidentiality
privileges, . . . powerful disincentives to self-examination will remain’’ (Hunt
and Wilkins 1992:366).
State immunity statutes provide a different way of protecting voluntary dis-
closers, preserving state regulators’ access to all relevant information about
4. US EPA’s ‘‘Show Cause Letter Regarding EPCRA Section 312 Sector Agreement’’ and
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a firm’s compliance, but preventing them from penalizing a company for vio-
lations it voluntarily discloses (Kaisersatt 1996; Gardner 2003). In many ways,
state immunity statutes simply mimic the protection that most federal volun-
tary programs already provide. However, this protection can be important be-
cause facilities often face overlapping state and federal regulatory obligations,
and without immunity, information disclosed under a federal voluntary pro-
gram could later be used in a prosecution by state regulators.
A large surveyofUSmanufacturing facilities found that nearly a third of those
thatwere not conducting internal audits declined to do so based on a concern that
regulators might obtain an audit report and use it against them (Morandi 1998).
A majority of such facilities located in states without immunity or privilege
laws claimed they would begin conducting internal audits if their state passed
such laws (Morandi 1998). These theoretical arguments and claims by company
representatives have been subjected to little empirical evaluation. We remedy
this by examining the extent to which state-level audit privilege and immunity
statutes encourage organizations to self-report compliance infractions.
4. Data and Measures
4.1 Sample
Our sampling approach attempts to surmount a major limitation of much of the
empirical research on self-regulation. Because the homogeneity of interests
among similar firms fosters bonds that can facilitate effective self-monitoring
(Rees 1994), many empirical studies of self-regulation have focused on a single
industry or, in some cases, a handful of firms (e.g., Rees 1994; King and Lenox
2000; Welch et al. 2000; Gunningham et al. 2003; Rivera and de Leon 2004).
Our sample spans a wide variety of industries, which should produce more
generalizable insights about the dynamics of industry self-regulation.
Our sampling frame includes manufacturing and other facilities engaged
in pollution-intensive industries that are subject to US EPA’s Toxic Release
Inventory program, as well as two federal regulations that apply to a broad
array of industries: the US Clean Air Act (CAA) and the US Resource Con-
servation and Recovery Act (RCRA). This frame yields a sample of 17,464
facilities during our study period of 1997–2003 that have 10 or more employ-
ees, manufacture or use significant amounts of toxic chemicals (typically
10,000 pounds), emit air pollutants beyond CAA regulatory thresholds, and
generate, manage, store, or treat hazardous waste.
4.2 Measures
We measured voluntary disclosure as a dummy variable, coded 1 for a facility
in a year when it disclosed a compliance violation in conjunction with the US
EPA Audit Policy. We constructed the most comprehensive data set possible
of Audit Policy self-disclosures. We began by merging data from the US EPA
Integrated Compliance Information System (ICIS) database and the (hard-
copy) US EPA Audit Policy Docket. Discussions with US EPA revealed that
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both these sources were incomplete, which led us to also include facilities that
participated in Compliance Incentive Programs by self-disclosing violations
under the Audit Policy. We present the annual number of facilities self-
disclosing violations to the Audit Policy in Table 1.
We measure the specific deterrence effect of inspections and inspector-
discovered violations using data from US EPA’s Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act Information (RCRAInfo) database and Aerometric Informa-
tion Retrieval System/AIRS Facility Subsystem (AIRS/AFS) database.5 We
measure whether a facility had an enforcement action using data obtained from
US EPA’s ICIS database. In our empirical model for the selection analysis, we
lagged each of these variables one year.
We considered two types of general deterrence. First, we considered the
facilities and sectors that were targeted by US EPA Compliance Incentive
Programs that encouraged them to review their compliance status and consider
self-disclosing violations via the Audit Policy. US EPA typically announces
Compliance Incentive Programs in its Enforcement Alert newsletter or on its
Web site, and it often contacts affected facilities directly by letter. Facilities
may also learn about these programs through trade associations that have part-
nered with US EPA for the initiative. We gathered data about Compliance
Incentive Programs through a Freedom of Information Act request.6 The sec-
ond form of general deterrence we considered is US EPA’s announcement of
Table 1. Number of Facilities that Disclosed Violations to the Audit Policy, 1997–2003
(1) All facilities (2) All facilities (3) Our sample
1997 457 153 40
1998 950 251 54
1999 990 412 113
2000 Not available 773 221
2001 1754 603 175
2002 Not available 777 83
2003 614 520 66
Total 3489 752
Sources: Data in column 1 were obtained from various US EPA reports and newsletters that provide updates on
participation in the Audit Policy. The other columns reflect facility-level data that we obtained from three sources via
Freedom of Information Act requests: the US EPA ICIS database, the (hardcopy) US EPA Audit Policy Docket, and
lists of facilities that disclosed under the Audit Policy in response to the Compliance Incentive Programs. According
to discussions with US EPA, the disparities between the database we constructed from US EPA databases and
documents and US EPA’s own aggregate figures are likely due to several factors, including: (1) their reports
typically refer to fiscal years rather than calendar years, (2) US EPA does not always enter facility-level data into
their databases when a corporation simultaneously discloses tens or hundreds of violations across multiple
facilities, and (3) data coding errors or omissions. Column 3 refers to the sample used in our empirical analysis:
facilities that report data to the US EPA Toxic Release Inventory program and are subject to hazardous waste
regulations pursuant to the RCRA and air regulations pursuant to the CAA.
5. To reduce the potential influence of outliers, for each of these variables we recoded values
above the 99th percentile to the 99th percentile value.
6. Compliance Incentive Programs that affected our sample include the National Iron & Steel
Mini-mills Program,National Industrial Organic Chemicals Program,National Nitrate Compounds
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National Priority Sectors. US EPA announces its 2-year priorities in Memo-
randa of Agreement, which we obtained from the agency’s Web site.7 Because
US EPA typically announces its National Priorities the year before they take
effect, we considered facilities to be targeted by National Priorities for 3 years:
the announcement year and the 2 years they were in effect. Because some
National Priorities are implemented through Compliance Incentive Programs,
we created three dummy variables to reduce multicollinearity: (1) National
Priority Sector and Compliance Incentive Program Target, (2) National Pri-
ority Sector only, and (3) Compliance Incentive Program Target only. We also
created a post-Compliance Incentive Programs target dummy variable, coded
1 in years after a facility was first targeted by a Compliance Incentive Program
and 0 otherwise, to measure any lasting effects such targeting might have.
We created two dummy variables to indicate whether a facility was located
in a state that provided audit privilege and/or immunity in a given year. We
constructed these variables using the data from Morandi (1998), US EPA’s
Audit Policy Web site, and a private web service run by the Auditing Round-
table. We resolved any inconsistencies by referring to the actual statutory lan-
guage in LEXIS-NEXIS state statutory databases. Our coding of this variable
is presented in the Appendix, Table A1.
Surrounding communities have been shown to influence facilities’ compliance
behavior (Hamilton 1999; Kagan et al. 2003; Shapiro 2005), and thus commu-
nities may also influence facility decisions to self-report violations. To control
for this, we include three variables that capture the community’s demographic
characteristics and potential ability to organize politically: log population density
calculated as the average number of residents per square mile in the facility’s
Census Tract based on the US Census Bureau’s 2000 Decennial Census,8 (2)
log household income within each facility’s Census Tract using data from the
2000 Decennial Census, and (3) voter turnout calculated as the proportion of
residents aged 18 and over in the facility’s county who voted for a presidential
candidate in the 2000 general election9 as a proxy for a community’s level of
political awareness and participation (Hamilton 1993, 1999). County population
data were obtained from the 2000 Decennial Census, and voting data were
obtained from Lublin and Voss (2001) for all states except Alaska.
We also control for facility size, which is commonly associated with com-
pliance behavior (Edelman 1990; Brehm and Hamilton 1996). We estimate
7. National Priority sectors in our sample include chemical preparation (1998–1999), coal-fired
power plants (1996–1999), industrial organic chemicals (1996–1999), iron and basic steel products
(1996–1999), metal electroplating and coating (2000–2003), mining (1996–1997), petroleum re-
fining (1996–2003), plastic materials and synthetics (1996–1997), primary nonferrous metals
(1996–1999), printers (1996–1997), and pulpmills (1996–1999) (http://www.epa.gov/compliance/
data/planning/shortterm.html [last updated March 17, 2005]).
8. To reduce the influence of outliers, we recoded values outside the 1st and 99th percentiles to
these limits and took the log of the trimmed values.
9. To reduce the potential influence of outliers, we recoded values above the 99th percentile to
the 99th percentile value. The county is the smallest geographic unit for which we could locate
voting data across the United States.
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facility size as the nationwide average revenues per establishment within each
4-digit SIC Code using data from the 1997 Economic Census, the most recent
year available. To control for potential differences between industries, we cre-
ate dummy variables for each 2-digit SIC Code to reflect the facility’s industry.
We created dummies for the 10 EPA Regions to control for differences in their
inspection coverage and enforcement strategies (US GAO 2000).10 Because
the prevailing ideology of US Circuit Courts has been shown to influence com-
pany decisions (Guthrie and Roth 1999), we control for the possibility that the
composition of the federal judiciary might affect the self-reporting decisions of
companies. Judges’ political ideology has been shown to affect their decision-
making on a wide range of issues, including environmental issues (Revesz
2001; Malmsheimer and Floyd 2004). We use the political party of the pres-
ident who appointed the judges as a proxy for the judges’ own political ideol-
ogy (Spence and Murray 1999), calculating the proportion of all Court of
Appeals judges who served during 1990–1994 (the last year for which data
are available) who were nominated by a Democratic president using data from
Zuk et al. (1996). We use the average proportion appointed by Democratic
presidents for each Circuit over 1990–1994 as our measure of Federal Circuit
Court ideology. Table A2 in the Appendix presents our coding of this variable.
Descriptive statistics and correlations of all variables are provided in Tables
2 and 3.
5. Empirical Model and Results
We model self-disclosure as a dichotomous decision made by each facility in
each year and employ a pooled probit model. In addition to enforcement
actions and statutory provisions, our key independent variables, we include
controls for local community characteristics, facility size, Federal Circuit
Court ideology, industry, and EPA Region as well as a full set of year dum-
mies. We employ robust standard errors clustered by facility.
Table 4 presents the results. To interpret the magnitude of the probit coef-
ficients, we calculate the marginal effects based on an infinitesimal change of
continuous variables, a unit change in count variables, or a discrete change in
dummy variables (Column B). We evaluate these marginal effects in the con-
text of the sample by dividing these marginal effects by the probability of dis-
closure evaluated at mean of all variables (Column C). This provides a more
intuitive explanation of the marginal effects as a percentage increase or de-
crease in the probability of disclosure compared to the probability predicted
from all variable means.
10. To better control for differences between state regulators’ strategies, resources, and rep-
utations, we also ran models that included state dummies, with and without state  year interac-
tions. Although these prevent us from including our statutory immunity and audit privilege







ollege of the L
aw






Table 2. Variable Definitions and Summary Statistics






Dummy coded 1 in a year
when a facility discloses
a violation under the US
EPA Audit Policy
0.007 0.082 752
RCRA inspections Number of regulatory
inspections per year
pertaining to the US
Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act (RCRA)
0.328 0.763 0 4
CAA inspections Number of regulatory
inspections per year
pertaining to the US
Clean Air Act (CAA)
0.620 0.793 0 3
RCRA violations Number of violations per
year pertaining to the US
Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act a
facility was cited with
by a regulator
0.308 1.159 0 7
CAA violations Number of violations per
year pertaining to the US
Clean Air Act a facility was
cited with by a regulator
0.039 0.194 0 3
Any enforcement
actions
Dummy coded 1 in a year








Dummy coded 1 in a year
when a facility was
among those targeted by
a US EPA CIP and the
industry was a US EPA
National Priority Sector
0.005 0.072 574
CIP target but not
National Priority
Sector
Dummy coded 1 in a year
when a facility was
among those targeted by
a US EPA CIP but the







Dummy coded 1 in a year
when a facility’s industry
was named a US EPA
National Priority Sector
but the facility was not
targeted by a CIP
0.135 0.342 14,933
Continued
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The statistically significant positive coefficients on inspections and enforce-
ment actions support our hypothesis that specific deterrence measures encour-
age self-disclosure. The results suggest that an additional RCRA inspection
increases the probability of self-disclosure the next year by 14% (p ¼
0.020) and that an additional CAA inspection increases this probability by
11% (p ¼ 0.053). Being subject to at least one enforcement action—a much
rarer event—had a much greater influence on disclosure, as our results suggest
that this more than doubles the likelihood of self-disclosing the next year com-
pared to the probability evaluated at the means of all variables (p< 0.001). We
found no evidence that the number of RCRA or CAA violations cited in
inspections had any influence on the decision to self-disclose a violation
Table 2. Continued







Dummy coded 1 in all years
after a facility was first




Dummy coded 1 in years




State immunity Dummy coded 1 in years







2000 of a facility’s
Census Tract




Per capita income in 1999
of a facility’s Census Tract
9.724 0.866 0.000 12.055
Voter turnout in
2000 (county)
Percent of population that
voted for US president
in the 2000 elections
in a facility’s county






facility in 1997 in a
facility’s 4-digit SIC Code










0.324 0.102 0.125 0.467
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
1 Self-disclosure via the Audit
Policy (dummy)
1.00
2 RCRA inspections 1 year ago 0.02 1.00
3 CAA inspections 1 year ago 0.02 0.12 1.00
4 RCRA violations 1 year ago 0.01 0.55 0.06 1.00
5 CAA violations 1 year ago 0.01 0.06 0.16 0.03 1.00
6 Any enforcement actions 1
year ago (dummy)
0.04 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.09 1.00
7 CIP target and National
Priority Sector (dummy)
0.03 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 1.00
8 CIP target but not National
Priority Sector (dummy)
0.14 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 1.00
9 National Priority Sector but not
CIP target (dummy)
–0.01 0.08 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.03 1.00
10 CIP target in any prior year
(dummy)
0.07 0.07 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.14 0.17 0.01 0.01 1.00
11 State audit privilege (dummy) 0.01 0.02 0.08 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 1.00
12 State immunity (dummy) 0.01 0.03 0.10 0.04 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.60 1.00
13 Log population density in
2000
0.01 0.06 0.10 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.00 0.07 0.03 1.00
14 Log per capita income in 1999 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 1.00
15 Voter turnout in 2000 0.00 0.04 0.09 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.04 0.16 1.00
16 Log facility subindustry
revenues in 1997
0.04 0.10 0.14 0.02 0.10 0.06 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.09 0.01 0.03 0.10 0.02 0.01 1.00
17 Federal Circuit Ideology 0.01 0.07 0.11 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.16 0.14 0.14 0.10 0.26 0.08
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Specific deterrence RCRA evaluations 1 year ago 0.048 [0.021]** 0.0005§ 14
CAA inspections 1 year ago 0.038 [0.019]* 0.0004§ 11
RCRA violations 1 year ago 0.005 [0.013] 0.0001§ 1
CAA violations 1 year ago 0.040 [0.066] 0.0004§ 12
Any enforcement actions 1 year ago 0.276 [0.063]*** 0.0044¤ 118
General deterrence CIP target and National Priority Sector 0.365 [0.124]*** 0.0067¤ 179
CIP target but not National Priority Sector 1.358 [0.076]*** 0.0894¤ 2382
National Priority Sector but not CIP target 0.047 [0.059] 0.0005¤ 13
Information CIP target in any prior year 0.528 [0.059]*** 0.0118¤ 315
Statutory provisions State audit privilege 0.005 [0.057] 0.0001¤ 1
State immunity 0.073 [0.052] 0.0008¤ 22
Controls Log population density in 2000 0.031 [0.222] 0.0003 9
Log per capita income in 1999 0.007 [0.019] 0.0001 2
Voter turnout in 2000 0.311 [0.258] 0.0035 93
Log facility revenues in 1997 0.101 [0.019]*** 0.0012 31
Federal Circuit Court ideology 0.035 [0.263] 0.0004 11
Industry fixed-effects Included***
Year fixed-effects Included***
US EPA region fixed-effects Included***
Observations (facility-years) 110,611
Facilities 17,464
Log likelihood intercept only 4502.70
Log likelihood full model 3899.28
Likelihood ratio 1206.84***
McFadden’s pseudo R-squared 0.13
Probability of disclosure evaluated at mean of all variables 0.0038
‘‘Marginal effect’’ is the change in the probability of adoption, evaluated at the mean all variables, based on an infinitesimal change in each continuous independent variable, a unit change in each count variable
(denoted §), or a discrete change in each dummy variable (denoted ¤). ‘‘Marginal effect to baseline probability’’ is the marginal effect as a proportion of the probability of disclosure evaluated at the mean of all
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the subsequent year (controlling for inspections). In addition, the coefficients
on the two violations variables are not jointly significantly different from
0 (p ¼ 0.78), nor is their sum (p ¼ 0.60).
As for general deterrence mechanisms, facilities targeted by a US EPA
Compliance Incentive Program were significantly more likely to self-disclose
violations. A facility targeted by both a Compliance Incentive Program and a Na-
tional PrioritySectorwasnearly three timesmore likely to self-disclose a violation
thatyear thantheaveragefacility targetedbyneitherprogram.Afacility targetedby
just aComplianceIncentiveProgram(andnotaNationalPrioritySector)wasmore
than20timesmore likely toself-discloseaviolationthatyear.Thiskindof targeting
also has lasting effects: facilities targeted by Compliance Incentive Programs,
which typically provide detailed information about the Audit Policy, were four
times more likely to self-disclose in the years after they were initially targeted.11
However, we found no evidence that facilities targeted only as part of a National
Priority Sector—and not simultaneously targeted by a Compliance Incentive Pro-
gram—were anymore likely to self-disclosewhile theywere consideredNational
Priorities than facilities that were not targeted by either program.
The coefficients on the statutory immunity and audit privilege variables are
positive, as predicted. Although each of these coefficients is not statistically sig-
nificant, theirsumisnotfarfromconventionalsignificancelevels(p¼0.17).This
provides some indication that statutoryprotectionsencouragedisclosure, but the
high correlation between the immunity and privilege variables (q ¼ 0.61) pre-
vents us from estimating their effects precisely. Because these variables were
measured at the state level, we reran our model clustering the standard errors
by state. In this model, the immunity coefficient is statistically significant
(p ¼ 0.07). Its magnitude suggests that facilities are 22% more likely to self-
disclose a violation in years in which states provide immunity. The coefficient
on audit privilege remained insignificant regardless of the clustering technique.
6. Discussion and Future Research
6.1 Discussion
Our findings suggest that even as voluntary industry self-regulation programs
proliferate, government still has an important role to play in encouraging self-
policing. We have shown that facilities are more likely to self-report violations
when they are subject to frequent inspections and targeted by focused com-
pliance initiatives. In fact, self-reporting is not deterred even by ostensibly
hostile relations with regulators. Firms that recently experienced enforcement
11. Because smaller facilities may be particularly unaware of their legal responsibilities (Brehm
andHamilton1996), theymightalsohavebeenunawareof theAuditPolicy.Weranaseparatemodel to
test this, but found no evidence of this. We included three dummies for facility size (small, moderate,
large) using as cutpoints the 25th and 75th percentiles of facility revenues, as well as three terms that
interacted thesesizedummieswith thepost-CIP targetvariable.Althoughall threecoefficientson these
interactiontermsarepositiveandstatisticallysignificant,Waldtestsindicatethattheydonotstatistically
differ from one another, nor do the coefficients for the interaction terms for just the large and small
facilities.
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actions, which involve significant legal costs and often result in penalties
and injunctive relief, are much more likely to self-disclose than those with
fewer compliance problems. In addition, we find some evidence that self-
disclosure is more likely when statutory immunity is provided but no evidence
that statutory audit privilege has any influence. Together, these findings
support a regulatory policy that recognizes the ongoing importance of govern-
ment regulation and regulators to the success of public-private regulatory
partnerships.
Our findings that more inspections and enforcement actions encourage self-
disclosure build on related research showing that compliance improves sub-
sequent to both inspections (Magat and Viscusi 1990; Braithwaite and Makkai
1991; Laplante and Rilstone 1996; Kuperan and Sutinen 1998; Winter and
May 2001; Gunningham et al. 2005; Gray and Shadbegian 2005) and enforce-
ment actions (Gray and Scholz 1991; Aoki and Coiffi 2000; Gunningham et al.
2005; Gray and Shadbegian 2005; Mendelhoff and Gray 2005; Shimshack and
Ward 2005). We argue that self-policing and compliance respond similarly to
these deterrence incentives because participating firms use self-reports as a sig-
nal to convey a ‘‘pro-compliance’’ image to regulators. Because regulators
consider a facility’s ‘‘motivation’’ and ‘‘willingness to comply’’ when prior-
itizing their enforcement activities (US EPA 1992), frequently inspected or
prosecuted facilities may attempt to reduce their scrutiny by bolstering the
regulator’s confidence in their commitment to compliance.
This finding has a number of implications for the economic literature on
self-policing. First, it suggests that self-reporting plays a much more compli-
cated role in enforcement regimes than is typically recognized. Economic
models conceptualize self-reporting as a way for companies to minimize
the costs associated with their violations and for regulators to minimize en-
forcement costs. However, such models fail to capture potential symbolic
and strategic dimensions, such as firms self-policing to improve their broader
relationship with the regulator. Second, our findings that inspections and en-
forcement actions motivate self-disclosure raise questions about regulators’
ability to shift enforcement resources away from self-reporting firms, as pre-
dicted by Kaplow and Shavell (1994). This casts doubt on the ability of reg-
ulators to improve their effectiveness by relying on self-policing as a substitute
for enforcement measures.
Our general deterrence results similarly suggest the ongoing importance of
regulatory oversight to the success of self-policing. Self-reporting was more
likely among facilities targeted by US EPA Compliance Incentive Programs,
which are often announced directly to targeted firms through letters or trade
associations and typically offer technical compliance assistance along with
the incentives of the Audit Policy. This effect lasted long after the conclusion
of these particular programs, with firms previously targeted by aCompliance In-
centive Program more likely to report unrelated violations in subsequent years.
On the other hand, we find no evidence that facilities targeted by industry-wide
US EPA National Priorities were any more likely to voluntarily self-disclose
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apparent disparity. For example, facilities in National Priority Sectors might not
be aware that they are a target since they are not notified directly, as typically
occurs with Compliance Incentive Programs. This suggests that the more infor-
mation regulated firms have about the Audit Policy, the more likely they are
to participate (Brehm and Hamilton 1996). Even facilities that are aware that
they are in a National Priority Sector may believe that heightened scrutiny of
a broadly defined industry does not significantly increase their risk of apprehen-
sion, whereas Compliance Incentive Programs often target fewer than 100
facilities—and in some cases as few as 20. In any event, our results suggest
an interesting convergence of compliance/deterrence strategies that has yet to
be developed in the literature: general deterrence appears to be more effective
the more targeted or ‘‘specific’’ it is.
Contrary to prior research showing that more inspector-discovered viola-
tions led facilities to improve their compliance (Gray and Scholz 1993;
Helland 1998), we find no evidence that violation frequency increases the likeli-
hoodof self-disclosures. Themere presenceof inspectors at a facility, or the threat
of their arrival through targeted compliance initiatives, apparently encourages
self-reporting regardless what they find once they get there. This discrepancy
may result from differences between compliance and self-policing behavior: fa-
cilities previously cited for violations can only improve their standing with the
regulator by cleaning up their act and complying; however, it appears that such
facilitiesdoubt that theywill earn theregulator’sgoodwillbydisclosingadditional
violations.
We find some evidence that facilities are more likely to self-disclose vio-
lations if their state provides statutory immunity, but facilities shielded by
state-level statutory audit privilege were no more likely to self-report viola-
tions. Our finding on audit privilege confirms the results of a 1998 survey that
found that facilities self-disclosed violations and conducted internal audits at
the same rate regardless of whether they were protected by statutory audit priv-
ilege (Morandi 1998). Audit privilege laws may have little effect because firms
have a variety of incentives to conduct internal compliance audits apart from
regulatory self-policing programs (Gardner 2003). If this is correct, audit priv-
ilege shields will provide cover for corporate wrongdoing without providing
countervailing benefits in the form of increased self-policing or self-reporting.
These results demand a thoughtful reexamination of the many economic and
policy arguments in support of secrecy for audit materials.
Audit privilege is a blunt instrument that has significant ramifications
for enforcement and deterrence. It allows companies wide latitude to deny reg-
ulators and other potential enforcers access to important documents and tes-
timony about noncompliance. ‘‘First, and most important, audit privileges
insulate culpable agents from prosecution’’ (Arlen and Kraakman 1997)—
not only for voluntarily disclosed violations but also potentially for others
as well. US EPA and environmental groups have long resisted the enactment
of audit privilege laws on the grounds that they deprive the public of access to
information that is crucial to health and safety and hamper regulators’ ability to
detect and prosecute unreported wrongdoing (Bedford 1996; Woodall 1997).
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As the US EPA said in announcing the Audit Policy, ‘‘privilege, by definition,
invites secrecy, instead of the openness needed to build public trust in indus-
try’s ability to self-police’’ (US EPA 1995:66710). Access to internal facility
data is especially important in a regulatory system that has come increasingly
to rely on information disclosure as its own instrument of compliance
(Rechtschaffen 2004).
Our findings provide better support for the more limited protection of immu-
nity, which ‘‘remove[s] the fear of self-incrimination’’ (Kesan 2000:163) while
preserving public access to information that can be important to the protection
of health, safety, and the environment. Most immunity statutes are narrowly
tailored to protect only those violations that are promptly and voluntarily dis-
closed and remediated (Kaisersatt 1996), conditions also imposed by the Audit
Policy. Unlike privilege, which allows violators to strategically and prophylac-
tically shield information about their wrongdoing, immunity shields violators
from potential enforcement activity only after their violations have been dis-
closed. It rewards self-disclosers by reducing their costs without compromising
the deterrence-based enforcement regime that motivates them to come clean.
6.2 Future Research
Research on self-policing can be categorized into three domains: investigating
the drivers of self-policing, examining the design of self-policing programs,
and evaluating the effects of self-policing. By showing how government en-
forcement activities and statutory incentives influence self-reporting, our re-
search examines how regulators can encourage self-policing. Future research
could investigate other potential drivers, including internal corporate variables
such as board of directors composition and the relationship between facilities
and their parent companies in making compliance and self-reporting decisions.
Political factors such as pressure from communities and nongovernmental
organizations may also play an important role in self-policing. In addition,
future studies might focus on firms that choose not to participate in self-po-
licing programs. Although we have shown that agency enforcement activities
encourage self-reporting, they have managed to do so for only a small minority
of the regulated community. It would be useful to know whether increased
enforcement would increase participation more generally or whether nonpar-
ticipants require different kinds of incentives.
Research on program design has an important role to play in this regard.
Self-policing programs will not be successful unless regulators properly cal-
ibrate the overall mix of incentives. We have described how one particular
category of incentives influences self-reporting; future research could attend
to the way firms behave in response to different kinds of incentives, including
ex post and ex ante ‘‘carrots’’ and ‘‘sticks.’’
Finally, future research on self-policing should evaluate outcomes. To what
extent do self-policing programs meet the objectives of regulators and partic-
ipants? Do they reduce enforcement costs? Do self-policing programs have
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Self-regulation and self-policing have been touted as a new paradigm of reg-
ulation that trades outmoded ‘‘command-and-control’’ strategies for industry-
directed, market-based solutions. Although it is hard to deny that there are ben-
efits to fostering more cooperative relationships between the regulators and the
regulated, our research counsels caution in the face of arguments that coercive
regulatory strategies are ineffective or obsolete and that government should
cede to corporations the unfettered authority to regulate themselves. Offered
the option of self-policing under the Audit Policy, companies were apparently
willing to come clean only under the threat that they might be caught instead. It
appears that, even in the era of voluntary self-policing, ‘‘[i]nspections remain
the backbone of agency compliance monitoring programs’’ (Wasserman 1990).
Even as corporations are given an expanding role in their own governance, our
study shows that the success of ‘‘voluntary’’ self-policing depends on the con-
tinued involvement of regulators with coercive powers.
Appendix
Table A1. Internal Audit Statutory Protections: Privilege and Immunity
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
AK — — I&P I&P I&P I&P I&P I&P I&P
AL — — — — — — — — —
AR P P P P P P P P P
AZ — — — — — — — — —
CA — — — — — — — — —
CO I&P I&P I&P I&P I&P I&P I&P I&P I&P
CT — — — — — — — — —
DC — — — — — — — — —
DE — — — — — — — — —
FL — — — — — — — — —
GA — — — — — — — — —
HI — — — — — — — — —
IA — — — I&P I&P I&P I&P I&P I&P
ID I&P I&P I&P — — — — — —
IL P P P P P P P P P
IN P P P P P P P P P
KS I&P I&P I&P I&P I&P I&P I&P I&P I&P
KY I&P I&P I&P I&P I&P I&P I&P I&P I&P
LA — — — — — — — — —
MA — — — — — — — — —
MD — — — — — — — — —
ME — — — — — — — — —
MI — I&P I&P I&P I&P I&P I&P I&P I&P
MN I&P I&P I&P I&P I&P — — — —
MO — — — — — — — — —
MS P P P P P P P P P
MT — — I I I I I — —
Continued
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1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
NC — — — — — — — — —
ND — — — — — — — — —
NE — — — I&P I&P I&P I&P I&P I&P
NH — I&P I&P I&P I&P I&P I&P I&P —
NJ I I I I I I I I I
NM — — — — — — — — —
NV — — I&P I&P I&P I&P I&P I&P I&P
NY — — — — — — — — —
OH — — I&P I&P I&P I&P I&P I&P I&P
OK — — — — — — — — —
OR P P P P P P P P P
PA — — — — — — — — —
RI — — I I I I I I I
SC — I&P I&P I&P I&P I&P I&P I&P I&P
SD — I I I I I I I I
TN — — — — — — — — —
TX I&P I&P I&P I&P I&P I&P I&P I&P I&P
UT I&P I&P I&P I&P I&P I&P I&P I&P I&P
VA I&P I&P I&P I&P I&P I&P I&P I&P I&P
VT — — — — — — — — —
WA — — — — — — — — —
WI — — — — — — — — —
WV — — — — — — — — —
WY I&P I&P I&P I&P I&P I&P I&P I&P I&P
States that have provided statutory immunity (I), statutory audit privilege (P), both (I&P), or neither (—) during our sample
period are illustrated. Sources includeMorandi (1998), US EPA’s Audit PolicyWeb site (http://www.epa.gov/region5/orc/
audits/audit_apil.htm), and a private web service run by the Auditing Roundtable (http://www.auditing-roundtable.org).
We resolved any inconsistencies by referring to the actual statutory language in LEXIS-NEXIS state statutory databases.
Table A2. Federal Circuit Court Ideology Proportion of Judges
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